Why is Molly Midyette in prison, while her husband, Alex Midyette, is not? How can the difference between the outcome of the two trials be explained and reconciled?

Those are only two of the troubling questions being asked in the aftermath of Tuesday's jury verdict acquitting Alex Midyette of knowing or reckless child abuse but convicting him of the less serious charge of committing child abuse through criminal negligence.

At least the first question is easily answered: Having been convicted of the more serious "knowing or reckless" child abuse charge, by specific statute Molly Midyette became ineligible for any kind of bond, even though her case is up on appeal.

Not so Alex Midyette, who despite the apparent fact that nine of the 12 jurors would have convicted him of the same charge as his wife, can be, and has been, released on bond pending sentencing, and can even ask for an appeal bond once sentence is imposed.

Such is the difference that the votes of three jurors can have on the outcome of a trial, to say nothing of the lower range of possible sentences that Alex faces as the consequence of conviction.

While Molly received the minimum 16-year term, Judge Lael Montgomery could have sentenced her to 48 years. In contrast, Alex Midyette could be sentenced to as few as four years in prison and, at least in theory, is eligible for probation. A prison term, however, is far more likely, and he could be incarcerated for up to 32 years.

Post-trial interviews have revealed that at least one juror would have him sentenced to the same 16-year term as his wife. But because Alex Midyette was convicted of a "lesser" charge, most judges would feel compelled to impose a shorter sentence.

The seeming disparity in result turns on 12 jurors' perceptions of the difference between "knowing or reckless" action as opposed to "criminally negligent" conduct, a distinction which, at least between the concepts of recklessness and negligence, is remarkably subtle even to those who have legal training and years of courtroom experience.

Criminal negligence involves the failure to perceive a "substantial and unjustified risk" through a "gross deviation" from the standard of the "reasonable" person, while reckless behavior occurs when an individual consciously disregards that same "substantial and unjustified" risk. All in all, a remarkably fine line to draw.

Both juries found child abuse occurred, but the two trials were remarkably different.

In Molly Midyette's trial, held in Boulder, prosecutors charged that she failed to help her injured infant son and had participated in a coverup of abuse, delaying medical treatment for an unconscionable amount of time. The same prosecution team in Alex Midyette's Denver trial accused him of actually inflicting the injuries that led to the baby's death.

Molly's defense was that she had done nothing wrong and did not know that her son was injured. Alex's defense? That the three dozen or so separate fractures suffered by the boy were the result of a rare metabolic condition, not abuse.

Was the difference in outcome because of the quality of the defense attorneys or perhaps due to where the cases were tried? Almost surely not, as both Midyettes received top-notch legal representation, and only three votes separated the two verdicts from being essentially the same.

Had the jury accepted the disease-causation theory, Alex Midyette should have been acquitted, so having a Denver jury did not really benefit him that much. Ironically, the defendant who prosecutors portrayed as being responsible for actually inflicting the injuries may well receive the shorter sentence, but our legal system does not require consistent verdicts or, for that matter, consistent sentences.

Just fair trials and just sentences.

Scott Robinson is a Denver trial lawyer specializing in personal injury and criminal defense.